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TAXPAYER RIGHTS IN NONCUSTODIAL IRS
INVESTIGATIONS AFTER BECKWITH v. UNITED

STATES

It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government
should turn square comers. But there is no reason why the
square corners should constitute a one-way street.
Justice Robert Jackson 1

In 1975 the Internal Revenue Service conducted 812,336 field
audits; 355,000 resulted in the assessment of a civil tax deficiency.
Criminal tax fraud investigations, on the other hand, occur at a rate
of only one percent of the field audit total. 2 In their early stages,
' Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill. 332 U.S. 380, 387-88 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
IRS ANN. REP., Table 16, at 140 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 ANN. REP.]. In fiscal
1975 the IRS Intelligence Division recommended 2,760 prosecutions and conducted only
8,731 criminal investigations. Id. Investigations performed are not comparable with Audit
Division statistics because an investigation may encompass more than a single year and
consequently more than one tax return of a taxpayer. Letter from Donald C. Alexander,
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, to Sam M. Gibbons, Chairman, House
Subcomm. on Oversight, Comm. on Ways and Means, Feb. 22, 1977 (on file with the U.
MICH. J.L. REF.).
2
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a The reason for the FY74 fall-off is disputed. Commissioner Alexander maintains that the
FY73 recommendation of a then-record number of prosecutions caused an attendant drain
on manpower to prepare for and testify at trials during FY73. Letter from Donald C.
Alexander to Sam M. Gibbons (Feb. 22, 1977). Chairman Sam M. Gibbons of the Subcom-
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tax investigations are usually noncustodial in that no arrest is
contemplated with their focus on the determination of whether any
-crime has been committed. 3 Even though a civil audit may lead to a
criminal investigation, if the investigating IRS agents develop suspicions of criminal tax fraud, 4 a taxpayer may be unaware of the
potential criminal prosecution which inheres in civil tax investigations, and may not realize that evidence discovered in the course of
a civil tax investigation may be used against him in a criminal
prosecution. Indeed, even after civil audit has led to a criminal
investigation, a taxpayer may be unaware of such a development. 5
Accordingly, the circumstances under which IRS agents may discover incriminating evidence involve serious fourth and fifth
amendment issues. Suppression of evidence incriminating the tax-

mittee on Oversight, House c·ommittee on··ways and Means, maintains, first, that the FY73
investigations-completed figure actually represents the FY72 total, and, second, that FY74
was the first full year that Commissioner Alexander was in control, and that "[t]he only
apparent reason for the fall-off in completions is the change in the administration of IRS."
Letter from Sam M. Gibbons to the author (Mar. 24, 1977) (on file with the U. MICH. J.L.
REF.).
b The IRS explains the variance of FY75 and FY76 from the norm as being the result of its
change from a manual to a computerized reporting system. Thus, FY75 includes information
items which, but fur the changeover. would have appeared in FY76, and FY76 shows a
complementary decline. The average for the two years is approximately 55,000, a number
consistent with FY72-FY74. Letter from Donald C. Alexander to Sam M. Gibbons (Feb. 22,
1977).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir. 1970). See notes 15-16, 19
infra.
• Two Internal Revenue Service divisions are primarily responsible for income tax investigations. The Audit Division is comprised of revenue agents who perform civil tax audits in
order to determine the amount of tax deficiency which the taxpayer owes the government.
Criminal investigations are conducted by the special agents of the Intelligence Division.
Their primary duty is the investigation of alleged criminal violations of the tax laws. If, in the
course of a routine civil audit, a revenue agent finds evidence of criminal tax fraud, he must
immediately cease his audit and call in the Intelligence Division to uncover evidence for a
criminal prosecution. In fiscal 1976, 8,909 cases were referred by Audit to Intelligence
which accepted 3,555 for investigation. A degree of crossfertilization exists: the Intelligence
Division, in tum, forwarded approximately 39,500 information items to civil divisions
including Audit. Note, however, that cases are not identical with information items. Letter
from Donald C. Alexander to Sam M. Gibbons (Feb. 22, 1977).
It is arguable tl)at revenue agents have an incentive not to immediately report indications
of criminal tax fraud since they are evaluated in terms of the number of audits completed per
year and the dollar amount of total deficiencies assessed. 1975 ANN. REP., supra note 2;
Table 3, at 128, Tables 13 & 15, at 139; w. SURFACE, INSIDE INTERNAL REVENUE 70-71
(.1967). If a revenue agent reports a case of suspected tax fraud, he may be temporarily
diverted from his usual work since the special agent conducting the criminal investigation
will frequently request his assistance in determining the exact amount of the tax deficiency.
Accordingly, a revenue agent may uncover substantial incriminating evidence before turning
the case over to the Intelligence Division. See generally Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517, 535 (1971); Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34, 35 n.3 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968, 975 (C.D. Cal.
1969); INT. REV. MAN. (CCH) §§ 1118.4, 1118.6, 4200, 9110 (1967).
5
United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765, 768 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971);
United States v. Maciel, 351 F. Supp. 817, 818 (D.R.I. 1972); Stafford & Jackson, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Tax Investigations, 34 LA. L. REv. 703,
738-39 (I 974).
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payer 6 has been based on three theories: the fifth amendment
guarantees embodied in Miranda v. Airwna; 7 the "News Release" doctrine, which is derived from administrative warnings
published by the IRS as News Releases IR-897 and IR-949; 8 and
the fourth amendment ground that consent to search records has
been obtained through deception or misrepresentation by IRS
agents. 9
The recent Supreme Court decision in Beckwith v. United
States, 10 holding that Miranda does not extend to noncustodial tax
investigations,1 1 has important implications with respect to the
News Release doctrine and the involuntary consent grounds considered in motions to suppress evidence. This article will examine
Beckwith and its potential significance with respect to these other
doctrines, discussing the factors which the IRS and the courts

6
The scope of this article is limited to the Mirand_a, News Release, and involuntary
consent search grounds for suppression. See notes 7-9 infra. See generally Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76
YALE L.J. I (1966); Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES 660 (1966); Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 53
A.B.A.J. 517 (1967); Lyons, Tax Investigations Revisited, 29 TAX LAW. 477 (1976); Rqmbro, Civil Tax Proceeding Poses Danger of Self-Incrimination in Criminal Tax Case, 43 J.
TAX. 302 (1975);.Rothblatt, Income Tax Evasion: Dealing with the IRS Special Agents and
Prosecutor, JO C:RIM. L. BULL. 437 (1974); Segal, The Miranda Warnings: To What Extent
Must the IRS Comply in Tax Fraud Investigations?, 39 J. TAX. 76 (1973); Stafford &
Jackson, supra note 5; Note, The Effect of Miranda on Federal Income Tax Investigations,
17 Lov. L. REV. 729 (1971); Comment, Miranda and the IRS: Protecting the Taxpayer by
Administrative Due Process, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 751 (1975).
For a discussion of the related issues of civil summons and search and seizure see, e.g.,
Note, Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations: Limitations on the Scope of the Section 7602
Summons, 25 FLA. L. REV. 114 (1972); Note, Taxpayer Claiming Privilege Against Disclosure of Accountant's Work Papers Must Show Invasion of His" Private Inner Sanctum,'' 54
TEX. L. REV. 432 (1976); Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in Tax Investigations, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1055 (1975); Note, Search and Seizure of
Business Records by IRS Does Not Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination or Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1361 (1975).
7
384 u .s. 436 (1966).
8
The current warning was promulgated in News Release IR-949 (Nov. 26, 1968), 7
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) ,i 6946 (1968):
At the initial meeting with a taxpayer, a Special Agent is now required to identify
himself, describe his function, and advise the taxpayer that anything he says may
be used against him. The Spe~ial Agent will also tell the taxpayer that he cannot be
compelled to incriminate himself by answering any questions or producing any
documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance of an attorney before
responding.
IR-949 expanded the provisions of News Release IR-897 (Oct. 3, 1967), 7 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) ,i 6832 (1968): "On initial contact with a taxpayer, IRS Special Agents are
instructed to produce their credentials and state: •Asa special agent, I have the function of
investigating the possibility of criminal tax fraud.'" IR-897 further required special agents to
advise taxpayers of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to retain counsel if the
"initial contact" produces the need for further inquiries. The News Release, moreover,
explained that it was a response to numerous taxpayer inquiries and that "the recently
adopted procedures insure uniformity in protecting the constitutional rights of all persons."
See notes 63-67 and accompanying text infra.
• See notes I 11-38 and accompanying text infra.
10
425 U.S. 341 (1976).
11
Se-e notes 39-54 and accompanying text infra.
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should consider in order to assure fair treatment of taxpayers
during investigations.

I. BECKWITH v. UNITED STATES:
A LIMITATION OF MIRANDA

In Miranda v. Arizona, 12 the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers must specifically warn an individual of his constitutional rights when he is subjected to questioning while in
custody or while otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. 13 A significant element in the decision reached was
a judicial concern over the inherently coercive nature of station
house interrogations. 14 Nonetheless, the Court did not limit its
holding to station house interrogations; the holding embraces the
broad spectrum of circumstances ranging from police station interrogations to interviews conducted at a suspect' s home . 15 The
Court left unresolved the meaning of custody or of deprivation of
freedom of action in any significant way. 1'ti The Miranda Court did
not indicate whether warnings were required in noncustodial interviews; however, more recent Supr~me Court decisions have
stressed that warnings are required when a suspect is in custody, 17
384 u .s. 436 (1966).
Id. at 478-79. In the Court's language:
[A]n individual ... taken into custody or otheiwise deprived of his freedom ... in
any significant way and ... subjected to questioning ... must be warned prior to
any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.
14
Id. at 461, 466. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 41 I U.S. 218, 246, 247 (1973).
15
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 & n.46 (1966). See generally United States v.
Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969); Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" within the
Meaning of Miranda, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 335, 338-39. 382 (1968).
16
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 n.4 (1966). This famous footnote professes to
explain the "focus" of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), in terms of a suspect
having been taken into custody or otheiwise significantly deprived of his freedom. Subsequent commentary suggests that "custody" and "focus" are not alternative grounds for
requiring the warnings, but that "custodial interrogation" in Miranda "actually marks a
fresh start in describing the point at which the Constitutional protections begin." Kamisar,
supra note 15, at 339 (emphasis in the original). Judge Friendly has stated that "focus" is but
one factor in an objective test of whether an interview was in-custody and that "in the
absence of actual arrest something must be said or done by the authorities, either in their
manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates that they
would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so." United States
v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969).
17 Orozco v. Texas. 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. I (1968). See
1976 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 165. In Orozco, a murder suspect was held to have been
deprived of his freedom of action when several police officers awakened him from his bed,
placed him under arrest, and interrogated him in the isolation of his boarding house room.
The Court applied Miranda and suppressed the incriminating evidence the petitioner had
12

13
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and have held that Miranda does not apply to noncustodial questioning.18
The Internal Revenue Service does not require its agents to give
the Miranda warnings unless a suspect taxpayer has been taken
into custody or has otherwise been deprived of his freedom by the
authorities. ui Accordingly, indicted taxpayers have had little success in relying upon Miranda to suppress incriminating statements
made during interviews with IRS agents. Prior to Beckwith v.
United States, 20 the Supreme Court had considered Miranda's
application to IRS investigations in only one case, Mathis v. United States, 21 which, unlike most tax cases, undeniably involved a
custodial interview. Revenue agents interviewed Mathis concerning a suspected civil deficiency while he was imprisoned for an
unrelated conviction. Seeking to suppress the evidence obtained
during the civil interview, Mathis relied on the requirement that
Miranda warnings be given whenever a suspect is interviewed in
the inherently coercive atmosphere of a prison or station house.
The government contended that Miranda warnings were not required in routine civil tax investigations where no criminal prosecution was anticipated at the time of the interview. The Court
noted that a civil tax investigation might be initiated for the purpose of a civil action, but held that warnings are required because
possible criminal prosecution might stem from the investigation. In
the Court's view, a contrary decision would undermine Miranda's
protection of the fifth amendment rights of persons in custody. 22
Because Mathis involved an undeniably custodial interview, it
does not apply to most tax investigations. IRS interviews, whether
civil or criminal in 'tharacter, are usually noncustodial, taking place
in the homes or offices of taxpayers rather than in station houses or
prisons. Nonetheless, the setting of the interview does not deter-

divulged to the officers, Orozco v. Texas, 394 U .S at 327, thereby applying the Miranda
doctrine to custodial situations beyond station house interrogations. See also Brewer v.
Williams, 45 U.S.L.W. 4287 (S. Ct. Mar. 23, 1977).
18
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). where the Court stated that
Miranda "did not reach investigative questioning of a person not in custody ... , and it
assuredly did not indicate that such questioning ought to be deemed inherently coercive."
Id. at 247.
19
INT. REV. SERV., HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS, reprinted in INT. REV. MAN.
(CCH) ~ 242.133 (Extra Ed. No. 44. Mar. 12. 1975); CCH INT. REv. MAN. (CCH) ~ 9447.3(3)
(1974). The IRS has separate procedures for custodial and noncustodial interviews. Agents
must know the IRS definition of "custody" to perform their duties. Noncustodial procedures are covered by INT. REV. MAN. (CCH) ~ 9384.2. which refers all custodial interrogation cases to~ 9440. entitled "Arrests."~ 9442 states that to arrest is to take into custody,
and that custody imports "actual restraint or detention." In contrast, Miranda does not
require "arrest" as a necessary prerequisite to its warnings requirement. See notes 15-16
and accompanying text supra.
20
425 U.S. 341 (1976).
21
391 U.S. I (1968).
22
Id. at 4-5.
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mine whether the Miranda warnings should be given. 23 Typically the
taxpayer and agent will engage in a friendly conversation, during
which the taxpayer's freedom of movement is unrestricted. 24 In
such interviews agents rarely resort to threats or other intimidating
tactics. 25 Occasionally the taxpayer will be interviewed at an IRS
office. Although the setting of an IRS office more nearly resembles
the station house environment, the taxpayer arrives without the
compulsion of judicial process, the interviews are conducted in a
courteous atmosphere, and the taxpayer is free to leave at any
time. In the absence of an arrest, the courts have held that office
interviews are noncustodial. 26
While interviews either at the taxpayer's home or at an IRS
office might be viewed as constituting a substantial deprivation of
the freedom to act, 27 even prior to Beckwith, the overwhelming
majority of courts refused to extend the requirements of Miranda
to taxpayers in noncustodial situations. 28 This limitation of
Miranda has been justified on several grounds. Some courts have
suggested that it would be administratively burdensome to require
IRS agents to issue Miranda warnings at the beginning of each
interview and that it would be too costly for the IRS to supply
every indigent with an attorney upon request. 29 Moreover, it has
been suggested that suspect taxpayers who are interviewed in
23

See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
E:g., United States v. Allen, 522 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 1001
(1976) (office at home); United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3738 (June 21, 1976) (veterinary hospital of taxpayer).
25
E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Simon v. United States, 421 F.2d
667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943
(1970) (where the taxpayer voluntarily visited an agent's office, was not restricted as to his
freedom of movement, and received partial warnings). Cf Oregon v. Mathiason, 45
U.S.L.W. 3505 (S. Ct. Jan. 25, 1977) (per curiam) (where the Court found no custody or
other deprivation of freedom of action when a suspect came to a police station at the request
of an officer, was told that he was not under arrest, and there was no indication that the
suspect's freedom to depart was restricted in any way). But cf. United States v. Oliver, 505
F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974) (where a taxpayer voluntarily visited an IRS office upon invitation,
but was denied contact with a messenger from his attorney).
27 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 478 & n.46 (1966). See notes 15- 16 and accompanying
text supra.
28
E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 425 U.S 341
(1976); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558 (1st Cir.), affd on another ground, 394
U.S.316 (1%8); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
923 (1968); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1021 (1971); United States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v.
Stribling, 437 F.2d 765 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); United States v.
MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971); United States v.
Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973); Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1%8).
Contra United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickerson, 413
F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1%9). Cf. United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1971)
(dictum) (where the court suggested that a warning would be required once a civil investigation became criminal in nature).
29
E.g., United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 923 (1%8); United States v. Squeri. 398 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1968).
24
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noncustodial situations "must be prepared to look after themselves. " 30 Of greater significance are the distinctions which courts
have perceived between Miranda and the IRS cases. Courts have
emphasized the Miranda requirement of coercive circumstances
during an interview, and have rejected taxpayer's arguments that
warnings are required once the government suspects that a taxpayer has committed criminal tax fraud. 31 Noting that the inherently coercive nature of a custodial interrogation constitutes the
psychological foundation necessary for application of the Miranda
doctrine, courts have been unpersuaded that taxpayers not in physical custody when interviewed by IRS agents would feel compelled
to incriminate themselves. 32
In contrast to the majority view, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that, while "custody" connoted physical arrest or restraint, deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action in any significant way was
sufficient to invoke the requirements of Miranda. 33 In United
States v. Dickerson, 34 the court held that IRS agents must give
Miranda warnings upon their first contact with a taxpayer after the
Intelligence Division has opened a criminal file on the case. A
Revenue Agent discovered that a third party had made unreported
payments to Dickerson. The latter admitted to the agent that he
had not filed returns for certain years, whereupon the agent referred the case to the Intelligence Division for criminal investigation. Subsequently Dickerson was interviewed by a special agent
who neglected to advise him either of the criminal nature of the
investigation or of his constitutional rights. 35 Contending that his
misapprehensions with respect to his obligations and rights signifi~
cantly deprived him of his freedom of action, Dickerson sought to
suppress incriminating evidence divulged during the interview.
Although the government accurately maintained that Miranda was
limited to custodial interrogations, the Dickerson court refused to
30
Ul)ited States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1968); Morgan v. United States, 377
F.2d 507, 508 (1st Cir. 1967).
31
E.g., United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1021 (1971 ); United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1969); Cohen v. United
States, 405 F.2d 34, 38-39 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v.
Squeri, 398 F.2d 785. 789 (2d Cir. 1968). Taxpayers commonly refer to the "strength and
content" of government suspicions.
32
The court in United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d I, 9 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972), stated that
admissions made in circumstances of "manifest discomfiture" might be the equivalent of an
in-custody interrogation. At least one court seemed to recognize the posJ;ibility of
psychological custody apart from physical custody. United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433·F.2d
415, 419 (3d Cir. 1970). For a discussion of this aspect of Miranda, see notes 12-16 and
accompanying text supra.
33
United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Habig, 413 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir.
1969): United States v. Lackey, 413 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1969).
34
413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
3
-' Id. at 1112.
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adop.t a narrow definition of ·"custody" and did not interpret
Miranda restrictively. In the court's view, the IRS violated Dickerson's constitutional protections when it elicited incriminating
statements "in reliance upon the taxpayer's misapprehension as to
the nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond, and the possible consequences of doing so. " 36 According to the Seventh Circuit, Miranda warnings were required because of the objective
circumstances of adversarial confrontations between taxpayers
and the government; the subjective state of mind of individual
taxpayers was not relevant to the determination. 37 Thus, Dickerson held that the concept of inherent coercion was applicable to
noncustodial taxpayer interviews as well as to station house interrogations. Subsequent Seventh Circuit decisions also applied
Miranda in noncustodial taxpayer cases. 38
In Beckwith v. United States, 39 the Supreme Court rejected the
Seventh Circuit approach and held that Miranda did not apply to
noncustodial IRS investigations. Two special agents interviewed
Beckwith, first at the home of a friend and, later the same day, at
his place of business. At the outset of the initial interview, the
agents informed Beckwith that they were special agents responsible for criminal tax fraud investigations. The agents further informed him of the tax years which the IRS wished to investigate.
Although they did not give Beckwith the Miranda warnings, they
gave him the administratively mandated News Release IR-949
warnings. 40 Before the second interview, the agents advised
Beckwith that he was not required to release his books or other
records for their inspection. Throughout the interviews Beckwith
was not in the custody of the agents, nor was he significantly
restrained of his liberty; on the contrary, he was free to leave the
interview at any time, and was out of the sight of the agents more

36

Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1117. The court indicated thatlhe adversary process began when the Intelligence
Division formally entered the case with the intention of gathering evidence for the eventual
prosecution of a specified taxpayer.
38 For instance, in United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974) (per Stevens, J .),
the Seventh Circuit specified the equation which brought taxpayers who were not in custody
within the Miranda doctrine. The court stated that the practical effect of the taxpayer's
misapprehensions during questioning compelled incriminating admissions in a manner similar to the psychological compulsion inherent in a situation in which the suspect is under
physical restraint. The Oliver court found that the misapprehensions were tantamount to a
significant deprivation of a suspect's freedom of action. Id. at 305.
39
425 U.S. 341 (1976) (per Burger, C.J.). Mr. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment.
See note 49 and accompanying text infra. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented. See notes 55-56
and accompanying text infra. Mr. Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in United
States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974), see note 38 supra, did not take part in
Beckwith.
40
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 343 (1976). The Court quoted the IR-949
warning .in full, but did not identify it. See note 8 supra for the text of IR-949.
37
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than once, including his driving alone to his office for the second
interview. Indeed, Beckwith testified that the agents did not even
press him for answers to their questions. 41 Nevertheless, in the
course of the interviews, Beckwith not only made incriminating
statements, but also produced incriminating records. 42
In attempting to suppress the incriminating evidence, Beckwith
argued that three factors created psychological restraints which
severely limited his freedom of action during the interviews. 43
First, the government had "focused" a criminal tax fraud investigation upon him when the investigation became accusatory with
the goal of obtaining a confession. 44 Beckwith relied upon the
Dickerson court's conclusion that the investigation becomes accusatory when the Intelligence Division is called into the case. 45
He contended that Miranda extends to situations where the Intelligence Division has taken over the case in seeking evidence of
criminal tax fraud. The second factor relied upon by Beckwith was
his misapprehensions due to the complexity of the tax system and
his confusion and fear with respect to the consequences of noncooperation. Finally, noting that the agents did not inform him that
he might have counsel present during the interviews or that he
might remairi wholly silent, 46 Beckwith maintained that the IRS
intentionally sought to discourage the exercise of his constitutional
rights. The combination of these factors, argued Beckwith, placed
him under "psychological restraints" which were the "functional,
and, therefore, the legal, equivalent of custody. " 47

4
' Id. at 342-44. 344 n.4. Beckwith originally did claim that the agents had misled him as to
the purpose of the interview. The Court of Appeals found that he was not misled. and
Beckwith did not raise the issue before the Supreme Court. United States v. Beckwith. 510
F.2d 741. 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
42
Beckwith did not claim that his consent to the release of his records had been involuntary. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341. 344 (1976).
43
Id. at 344-45; Brief for Petitioner at 7-8. 18. Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341
(1976).
"Brief for Petitioner at 11-12. Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.s.·341 (1976). Beckwith
relied upon Escobedo v. Illiriois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). in arguing that the accusatory stage of
an investigation is reached when an investigation has focused on a particular individual.
45
See note 37 supra.
46
In these respects Beckwith contended that the News Release IR-949 warnings. which
he was given. were inadequate. See United States v. Oliver. 505 F.2d 301. 304 n.6 (7th Cir.
1974). and note 60 infra.
47
Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341. 345 ( 1976). This argument had been accepted
at neither the district court nor circuit court levels. Judge Bazelon. in United States v.
Beckwith. 510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1975).aff"d, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). stated that the interview
had none of the indicia of coercion that prompted the Miranda analysis so that one could not
conclude that the taxpayer was compelled to answer questions. Noting with approval that
Beckwith was given warnings which did provide some notice that his statements might be
used against him. Judge Bazelon isolated Beckwith's error as a confusion of the requisites of
compulsion with the requisites of waiver:
The fact that a statement might be made in such a manner as to raise doubts that it
constitutes a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and the right to
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The Supreme Court did not accept Beckwith 's characterization
of the I RS interviews. In the Court's view, the central question was
whether an IRS special agent, investigating potential criminal tax
violations, must give the Miranda warnings before conducting a
noncustodial interview of a taxpayer.-1 8 Observing that Beckwith
had been neither arrested nor involuntarily detained, the Court
characterized the interviews as noncustodial and held that the IRS
was not required to deliver the Miranda warnings to taxpayers in
such situations.-t!i While conceding that Beckwith had probably
been the "focus" of a criminal investigation, the Court rejected the
argument that the interview conducted by the IRS agents was
functionally equivalent to a custodial interrogation. The Court
noted that Miranda had defined "focus" in terms of police questioning initiated after a person has been taken into custody or
significantly deprived of his freedom of action.~ 0 It was unpersuaded, however, by the argument that merely being the target of
the government's suspicions requires use of the Miranda warnings
in the absence of compulsion. Acceptance of the "functional equivalent" equation would have been incompatible with the Court's
view that the inherently coercive nature of in-custody police interrogations was the crux of the Miranda decision.~ 1 In categorically
remain silent does not necessarily mean that it was coerced or compelled within the
intendment of the Self-Incrimination clause.
Id. at 743. Since Beckwith's statements to the agents were held to have been voluntarily
made. the waiver issue was vitiated.
" Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341. 342-43 (1976). The question of the sufficiency
or necessity of the News Release warnings was not presented in Beckwith.
49
Id. at 344. See note 16 supra for Judge Friendly's objective test for an in-custody
interrogation. Beckwith. being free to leave at any time, did not present the crucial element
of custody under that test. The Government in Beckwith unsuccessfully asked the Court to
further hold that the IRS might adopt a "uniform policy dispensing with the [IR-949]
warning" if it so wished. Reasoning that the warnings were promulgated "out of an
abundance of caution" for the sake of uniformity in administration end to avoid jeopardy in
the courts, the Government argued that the reasons for the News Release warnings would be
vitiated if Miranda was h_eld inapplicable to IRS interviews. Brief for Respondent at 34-35,
Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341 ( 1976). See also notes 93-95 and accompanying text
infra.
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment because he believed that in administering the
News Release IR-949 warning to Beckwith the agents had under the circumstances satisfied
the requirements of the fifth amendment. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348-49
(1976). By implication. Justice Marshall accepted the majority's holding that Beckwith's
situation failed to require Miranda warnings.
00
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). The Beckwith Court did not
specifically cite Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). but cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436. 444 & n.4 (1966). See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
51
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341,346 (1976), quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436. 445 (1966). Moreover. the Court interpreted its post-Miranda decisions as specifically stressing that the Miranda warnings were only required when interrogations were
custodial in nature. Id. at 346. 347. See also Orozco v. Texas. 394 U.S. 324 ( 1969); Mathis v.
United States. 391 U.S. I (1968). Mathis was cited as support for the proposition that "the
Miranda requirements are applicable to interviews with Internal Revenue agents concerning
tax liability, when the subject is in custody .. .. " Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341,
347 (1976) (emphasis supplied by the Court). See text at notes 21-22 supra. The Beckwith
Court found support in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U .S 218 (1973). See note 18 supra.
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rejecting the "functional equivalent" argument. the Court did not
specifically discuss Beckwith 's • argument that taxpayer confusion
is inherent in IRS interviews.
Significantly, the Beck1Fith Court conceded that "noncustodial
interrogation might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some
special circumstances," produce involuntary confessions attributable to the overbearing conduct of law enforcement officials. ;; 2 The
scope of this limitation is uncertain since the Court did not specify
what would constitute "special circumstances." Although physical
brutality or threats of physical violence would seem to be "special
circumstances," such factors are unlikely to be present in I RS
investigations. Violations of IRS regulations, subterfuge, and deception by IRS agents might also satisfy the Court's limiting language.~3 Finally, the individual characteristics of the taxpayer,
including the presence of physical, mental, or emotional infirmities, should also be a relevant consideration." 4 Nevertheless, the
Court's language is so qualified that few taxpayers in noncustodial
situations will be protected by the "special circumstances" standard.
Although the Beckll'ith majority rejected the Seventh Circuit
approach, Justice Brennan, in dissent, maintained that the noncustodial setting in Beck1l'ith was not determinative of whether IRS
agents were required to give the Miranda warnings. In his view the
misapprehensions of the taxpayer produced "practical compulsion" which was "comparable to the psychological pressures described in Miranda.";;.; Consequently, even a noncustodial interview could lead to the involuntary release of incriminating information. Justice Brennan, relying. upon the Seventh Circuit's approach ,;; 6 concluded that Beckwith 's conviction should be reversed.
In sum, the decision in Beckll'ith ,,. United States virtually precludes reliance on Miranda as .a basis for suppressing evidence
obtained through noncustodial IRS interviews. Few local courts
have had the opportunity to consider the scope of Beckwith."; and

"Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341. 347-48 (1.976). quoting Rogers v. Richmond.
365 U.S. 534. 544 (1961).
53
This possibility is enhanced by the Court's citation of a case which. although custodial
in setting. involved deception used to obtain a confession. Rogers v. Richmond. 365 U.S.
534 ( I96 I) (where a confession was elicited by the use of a sham telephone conversation to
convince an imprisoned suspect that his arthritic wife would be jailed if he refused to speak).
54
Cf. United States v. Heffner. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). where the taxpayer clearly
was emotionally disturbed. Heffner was decided under the News Release doctrine. See
notes 76-77 and accompanying text infra.
55
Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341. 349-50 (1976) (Brennan. J .. dissenting).
56
/d. at 350-51. relying on United States v. Oliver. 505 F.2d 301. 304-05 (7th Cir. 1974).
57
The impact of Beckll'it/i is evident in United States v. Dreske. 536 F.2d 188 (7th Cir.
1976). where the defendant unsuccessfully asserted the "functional equivalent" and
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none have as of yet discussed the "special circumstances" exception. Nevertheless, Beckwith limits the utility of the fifth amendment to defendants in tax fraud cases. Thus, it seems likely that
taxpayers seeking to suppress evidence gathered through IRS in~estigations will increasingly rely upon the protections embodied
in the News Release doctrine and the fourth amendment.

II.

THE NEWS RELEASE DOCTRINE

The News Release doctrine provides that special agents of the
Internal Revenue Service must advise taxpayers of certain rights as
well as the criminal nature of the investigation pursuant initially to
IRS News Release IR-897, and now to its successor, IR-949. 58
Under the doctrine, incriminating evidence obtained in violation of
the warnings may be suppressed. The News Release warnings are
administratively imposed, and apply to the noncustodial interviews
characteristic of IRS investigations. 59 Promulgated after the
Miranda decision, they are similar in many respects to the Miranda
warnings. 60 News Release IR-897 required only that a taxpayer be
initially warned of the criminal character of the investigation.
"psychological compulsion" theories rejected in Beckwith. Although the Seventh Circuit
distinguished Dreske from its earlier holdings, it conceded that "Beckwith ... has undermined the vitality of Dickerson and Oliver." Id. at 195. See note 37 supra. Similarly, United
States v. Venditti. 533 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1976). followed Becku·ith in holding that statements
made by a taxpayer to an IRS civil agent during the course of a "noncustodial, noncoercive
interview" were not to be suppressed. Id. In United States v. Vander Linden, Crim. No.
76-29 (S.D. Iowa July 6. 1976) (order granting motion to suppress). however. the court
viewed Beckwith only as indicating that the Constitution did not require the extraconstitutional protection provided to taxpayers by the IRS News Releases. Id. at 6-7. See
also United States v. Mullens. 536 F.2d 997. IOOO (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Nash. 414
F. Supp. 1213, 1217 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
58
United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Leahey, 434
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). See note 8
supra for lex ts of the releases.
59
Violation of due process, rather than the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. may provide a constitutional basis for suppression. Brief for Respondent at 35 n.25.
Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). See generally Note, Extending Miranda to
Administrative Investigations, 56 VA. L. REV. 690 (1970); Comment. Miranda and the IRS,
supra note 6. Cf. Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (stating that under the circumstances of the case the News Release IR-949
warnings satisfied the fifth amendment requirements).
60
One incentive of the News Releases was the concern of the IRS about possible court
reversals under Miranda. See note 49 rnpra: Note, supra note 59, at 714-15 n.120 (citing
letter from the Chief Counsel of the IRS). See generally United States v. Jobin, 76-1 T.C. ,i
9433 (I st Cir. 1976).
IR-949 essentially follows the text of the Miranda warnings, except for the notice of the
availability of government-appointed counsel for indigents. In United States v. Oliver. 505
F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974). the court criticized IR-949 for its failure to expressly tell the
taxpayer that he has the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during an
interview. The court noted that the News Release might convey the impression that the
taxpayer must answer every question. except those which might tend to incriminate him. Id.
at 304 n.6.
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Warnings resembling the Miranda warnings were required only if
the Intelligence Division decided to continue investigating after the
initial interview. News Release IR-949, which superseded IR-897,
requires that all of the warnings be delivered at the first meeting a
special agent has with a taxpayer after the investigation becomes
criminal. 61 The ostensible purpose of the News Release warnings
was to insure that the constitutional rights of taxpayers are uniformly protected 62 because the concern of special agents for the
constitutional rights of taxpayers under investigation varied
widely.
Courts which have accepted the News Release doctrine have
advanced several reasons for binding the Internal Revenue Service
to its warning procedure. 63 Some courts have noted that the constitutional principle established in Miranda was the incentive for
the administrative warnings, and have suggested that in view of
this impetus, judicial enforcement of the warning procedure should
not be considered burdensome to the IRS. 64 The News Release
doctrine has also been justified on the grounds that enforcement of
the administrative warnings would protect the constitutional rights
of taxpayers, and encourage uniformity in practice among IRS
agents. 65 One court expressed concern that judicial failure to enforce the warnings would not only erode the faith of the citizenry in
the evenhanded administration of justice, but would also leave the
IRS without an incentive to enforce the procedure. 66 The most
61
See note 8 supra. The News Releases were directed to special agents without any
mention of revenue agents. Thus, revenue agents acting as criminal investigators are not
expressly required to deliver the News Release IR-949 warnings to suspect taxpayers. The
issue of deception or misrepresentation may be raised when the purpose of the investigation
is other than what the taxpayer believes it is. See notes 112-15 and accompanying text infra.
News Release IR-949 was promulgated although numerous reviewing courts had already
stated that Miranda was not applicable in noncustodial situations. See, e.g., Hensley v.
United States, 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Mackiewicz. 401 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968); United States v. Bagdasian, 398 F.2d 971 (4th Cir.
1968); United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968); Taglianetti v. United States, 398
F.2d 558 (1st Cir.), affd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 316 (1968); White v. United States, 395
F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1968) (liquor violation). Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. I (1968), held
that a civil interview conducted in a prison setting met the custodial prerequisites of
Miranda. A district court had earlier held that Miranda warnings must be given once the
"focus" of a criminal investigation centered on the suspect taxpayer. United States v.
Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967). This result was followed in United States v.
Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Colo. 1968), but was rejected by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Beckwith, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). See text at note 50 supra.
62
See note 8 supra.
63
United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,i 9433 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Sourapas, 515
F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Dawson. 486 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Leahey. 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809
(4th Cir. 1969).
64
See, e.g., United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,i 9433 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v.
Leahey. 434 F.2d 7, IO (1st Cir. 1970).
65
See, e.g .. United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. 'J 9433 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v.
Leahey. 434 F.2d 7. 10 (1st Cir. 1970).
66
United States v. Leahey. 434 F.2d 7. IO (1st Cir. 1970).
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convincing argument in favor of the News Release doctrine, however, is that taxpayers may reasonably be expected to rely upon a
procedure which the IRS has publicly announced. 67 Because the
IRS chose to publish the warnings in response to concern about the
effects of the Miranda decision on IRS investigatory procedure,
courts should refuse to permit the IRS to take advantage of possible taxpayer reliance.
Despite these arguments, the News Release doctrine has been
accepted in only three circuits. 68 While most courts have not yet
decided the question, considerable resistance to the suppression of
evidence exists where agents have failed to comply with the administrative warnings procedure. 69 Two considerations against
binding the IRS to its warning procedure have been predominant.
First, the courts are reluctant to bind the IRS to a procedure which
extends taxpayer rights beyond the constitutional minima specified
in Miranda and its progeny. 70 Thus, even while conceding that the
News Releases enhance the fair treatment of taxpayers and that
their enforcement is not administratively burdensome to the IRS,
courts have refused to suppress evidence unless a taxpayer could
demonstrate coercion or misrepresentation which would raise
doubts about the voluntariness of an interview. Under this approach, compliance with the News Release warnings has merely
been considered evidence of voluntariness. 71
Courts have also rejected the News Release doctrine because of
their concern that strict application of the warnings would lead to
the suppression of evidence where there were only slight errors in
the delivery of the warnings. 72 Thus, one court denounced the
notion that evidence obtained from taxpayers who fully comprehend their criminality might be suppressed because an agent did

67
Id.: United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,i 9433 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Sourapas.
515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975).
68
See note 63 supra.
6
" United States v. Leonard. 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 44 U .S.L.W. 3624
(May 3. 1976); United States v. Mccorkle. 511 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Robson. 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973): Cohen v. United States. 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied. 394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v. Vander Linden. Crim. No. 76-29 (S.D.
Iowa July 6. 1976) (order granting motion to suppress); United States v. Trnka. 385 F. Supp.
628 (D.N .D. 1974).
70 United States v. Leonard. 524 F.2d 1076(2d Cir. 1975),cert. denied. 44 U.S.L.W. 3624
(May 3. 1976); Cohen v. United States. 405 F.2d 34. 39 (8th Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 394 U.S.
943 (1969) (dictum).
71 Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341. 348 (1976) (where the Court stated that
warnings were relevant to whether interviews were coercive); Cohen v. United States, 405
F.2d 34. 39 (8th Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969) (where the court stated that it
would consider evidence of warnings in response to allegations of deception).
72
United States v. Fukushima. 373 F. Supp. 212 (D. Hawaii 1974); United States v.
Bembridge. 335 F. Supp. 590 (D. Mass. 1971). rel''d, 458 F.2d 1262 (1st Cir. 1972). See
Comment. Miranda and the IRS. supra note 6.
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not "recite every syllable of a mumbo-jumbo formula. " 73 This line
of criticism, however, may misinterpret the practical implications
of the News Release doctrine, which does not require a perfect
rendition of the warnings, provided that their substance and spirit
is conveyed. 74 A few courts, unwilling to completely reject the
doctrine, have read News Release IR-949 as narrowly as possible
in order to a void applying it. n
Courts, which have adopted the News Release doctrine, have
disagreed with respect to the appropriate standard for determining
whether an agent has violated the warnings. In United States v.
Heffner, 76 although the taxpayer was warned of his right to be free
from compulsory self-incrimination, he was not informed at the
initial interview by special agents that they were criminal investigators. The Fourth Circuit held that the agents had failed to
"scrupulously observe" the procedure of News Release IR-897,
and ordered the suppression of the evidence they had obtained. 77 A
subsequent First Circuit case, United States v. Leahey, 78 involved
a taxpayer who, in an interview with special agents, received no
warnings whatsoever before making incriminating statements. The
court found support in Heffner for suppressing this evidence, but it
did not adopt the "scrupulous observance" standard set forth in
Heffner. Instead, the Leahey court concluded that IRS investigators must "conform" to the News Release IR-897 warning
procedure. 79 Although the Leahey standard would appear to be
less demanding than the Heffner requirement, some courts have
interpreted both Heffner and Leahey as requiring agents to give the
warnings with complete accuracy. 80
In United States v. Bembridge, 81 the First Circuit considered

73 United States v. Bembridge. 335 F. Supp. 590; 592 (D. Mass. 1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d
1262 (1st Cir. 1972).
74
See notes 76-86 and accompanying text infra.
75 United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1089 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 44 U .S.L.W.
3624 (May 3, 1976); United States v. Vander Linden, Crim. No. 76-29, 6-7 (S.D. Iowa July 6,
1976) (order granting motion to suppress). The Leonard court stated that the taxpayer would
still lose, even if it were persuaded by the decision in Heffner because the News Releases
are addressed to special agents, and there was no evidence that the IRS consistently assigns
revenue agents to criminal investigations in order to dodge the News Release Doctrine. 524
F.2d at 1089. Both the Leonard and Vander Linden courts were reluctant to bind the IRS to
procedures which granted greater protections than the Constitution required.
76
420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
77 Id. at 811-12. The phrase. "scrupulously observe," was derived from Accardi v.
Shaughnessy. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
" United States v. Leahey. 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970).
79
Id. at 11.
80 United States v. Fukushima. 373 F. Supp. 212 (D. Hawaii 1974); United States v.
Bembridge. 335 F. Supp. 590 (D. Ma·ss. 1971). rev'd. 458 F.2d 1262 (1st Cir. 1972). See notes
72-74 and accompanying text supra.
"' 458 F.2d 1262 (1st Cir. 1972).
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this interpretation of its earlier decision in Leahey. Prior to an
interview Bembridge received an abbreviated Miranda warning
and was informed by a special agent that the investigation was
criminal in nature. Although the agent acted in good faith and in
accordance with the Internal Revenue Manual, he did not know the
text of News Release IR-949 which had been issued only a few
days prior to the interview. The court refused to suppress the
evidence, suggesting that Leahey and the News Release doctrine
should be interpreted as requiring substantial, but not absolute,
conformity with the News Release procedures. 82 Subsequent
courts have generally followed this standard in considering the
adequacy of the warnings given. 83 If agents have committed a
technical error when giving warnings, courts, which have adopted
the substantial compliance theory, will not suppress the evidence.
The further question of the exact nature of a disqualifying noncompliance remains without a comprehensive answer. 84
In reconciling Heffner and Leahey with subsequent cases, it
should be noted that both cases were decided under News Release
IR-897 which required a single, initial warning. 85 Clearly, a special
agent's failure to give that warning would be noncompliance. Thus,
the special agent's failure was encompassed not only by the "substantial compliance" standard, but also by the stricter "scrupulous
observance" and "conformity" terminology used in Heffner and
Leahey respectively. Since the promulgation of News Release
IR-949, the substantial compliance standard has become the accepted interpretation among courts applying the News Release
doctrine. 86
Nevertheless, under News Release IR-949, courts have continued to emphasize the importance of clearly informing taxpayers
that they are the targets of criminal_investigations. In United States
v. Sourapas, 87 for example, a special agent interviewing a taxpayer
failed to advise the suspect that the investigation was criminal in

2
"
Id. at 1264. The Court in Accardi held that the Bureau of Immigration Appeals was
bound by the adjudicatory rules and procedures it had established for itself when judging the
status of aliens in the United States. Accardi v. Shaughnessy. 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954).
3
"
United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,r 9433 (Isl Cir. 1976); United States v. Sourapas, 515
F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Morse, 491 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1974).
84
Failures in the accurate delivery of the Miranda warnings also do not automatically
result in suppressions of evidence. As to the right to counsel, compare Williams v. Twomey,
467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972). with Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1972).
As to the self-incrimination warning, see, e.g .. Davis v. United States, 425 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Grady, 423 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sanchez. 422
F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970). Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970), is a
holding against one version of the self-incrimination warning.
85
See note 8 and the text at note 61 supra.
86
United States v. Jobin, 76-1 T.C. ,r 9433 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Sourapas, 515
F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975).
87
515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975).
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nature, although he gave the remainder of the News Release IR-949
warnings. Having incriminated himself in the course of the interview, the taxpayer sought to suppress the evidence under the
News Release doctrine, citing the omission of an entire clause
from the required warnings. The Sourapas court approved the
reasoning in Heffner and Leahey of binding the IRS to its own
procedure, and suppressed the evidence on the ground that the
agent did not substantially comply with either of the News Releases.BB No case has involved warnings which convey notice that
the investigation was criminal in nature but which were deficient in
other particulars. It is uncertain whether this notice is necessary
for substantial compliance. Arguably, however, a taxpayer is more
likely to make a critical mistake if his true situation remains unknown to him.B 9
The courts which follow the News Release doctrine require only
that the warnings actually given must comply with the substance
and spirit of the News Release procedure. 90 In order to fail the
substantial compliance test, an agent must egregiously depart from
the requirement, either by wholly omitting one of the warnings or
by delivering a warning in such a form that its meaning would not
be readily comprehensible. The potential prejudice to a taxpayer is
evident, especially if he has relied on the requirement of the warnings as notice of a criminal investigation. 91 The fact that the administrative warnings are applicable to noncustodial situations,
where the Miranda doctrine is generally inapplicable, should not
justify administrative breaches of a published procedure.
Even in the absence of the Miranda incentive, the ostensible
reason for the News Releases-ensuring uniform IRS practice in
order to protect the rights of taxpayers 92 -remains. Despite the
Beckwith decision, the IRS has not yet altered or revoked News
Release IR-949, and taxpayers may continue to rely upon it in the
jurisdictions accepting the doctrine. 93 Moreover, at least two
88
/d. at 298. See also United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,i 9433 (1st Cir. 1976) (where an
agent failed to advise the taxpayer of his right to counsel in addition to not informing him of
the criminal character of the investigation).
89
The court in United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,i 9433 (1st Cir. 1976). stated that a
taxpayer might logically waive his right to remain silent during a presumably civil investigation for fear that the invocation of the fifth amendment would provoke a criminal investigation. Id. at 84.151.
90
United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,i 9433 (Isl Cir. 1976); United States v. Sourapas. 515
F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975).
91
Nevertheless. incomplete warnings hinting of possible criminal liability in the setting of
the investigation arguably put taxpayers on notice of their potential jeopardy. See note 100
and accompanying text infra. But see United States v. Jobin. 76-1 T.C. ,i 9433 ( I st Cir. 1976)
(note 89 supra).
92
See note 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
93
It is not clear that the IRS may revoke the warning procedure unilaterally. See Brief for
Respondent at 35, Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (where the government
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courts!' 4 have stated that the warnings are relevant to the question
of coercion or deception on the part of agents seeking to obtain
incriminating information from taxpayers.!!"

Ill.

TAX PA YER CONSENT TO

IRS

INVESTIGATIONS

In addition to involving the fifth amendment, IRS investigations
may involve fourth amendment questions with respect to searches
of taxpayers' recordsY 6 Although access to such documents may
be obtained through formal process, 97 agents, without relying on
this process, often seek and receive consent for an examination of
a taxpayer's records. 98 Taxpayers are especially likely to consent
to such searches by revenue agents conducting civil investigations.
Where IRS agents searching the files of a taxpayer discover incriminating information which is subsequent1y offered at a criminal
tax fraud trial, the defendant may seek to suppress the evidence on
the ground that consent was invalidly obtained through deception
or misrepresentation. 99
The fourth amendment protects a person's reasonable expecta-

asked the Court to hold that the IRS could withdraw the News Release procedure). See
generally Comment. Miranda and the IRS, supra note 6. The IRS has issued printed cards
bearing the warnings to its agents. Therefore. assuming proper discipline, the IRS should not
encounter News Release doctrine problems. Furthermore. the public relations value of
preserving the News Release warnings might provide a political constraint against their
withdrawal.
"" Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 34 I. 348 ( 1976); Cohen v. United States. 405 F.2d
34. 39 (8th Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969).
"' Such evidence is particularly useful in gauging the voluntariness ofa taxpayer's consent
to search. See Part III infra.
"" See, e.g., United States v. Stamp. 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Vander
Linden. ~rim. No. 76-29 (S.D. Iowa July 6. 1976) (order granting motion to suppress).
7
"
This article does not discuss taxpayer rights with respect to search warrants, subpoenae. or summonses. See Note. IRS Access to Bank Records: Proposed Modifications in
Administratit·e Subpoena Procedure, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 247 (1976); Note, Search and
Seizure of Business Records by IRS, supra note 6; Comment. Internal Rel'enue Sen•ice
Summoning Power, 21 N.Y.L.F. 477 (1976).
"" See, e.g., United States v. Stamp. 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Vander
Linden, Crim. No. 76-29 (S.D. Iowa July 6, 1976) (order granting motion to suppress).
99 United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Prudden, 424
F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Vander Linden,
Crim. No. 76-29 (S.D. Iowa July 6, 1976). A possible fifth amendment alternative has
been cast in doubt by the recent Supreme Court decisions of Andresen v. Maryland, 44
U.S.L.W. 5125 (June 29, 1976), and Fisher v. United States, 424 U.S. 391 (1976). The Court
in Andresen held that a search pursuant to a warrant of a taxpayer's business office and the
subsequent introduction at trial of evidence seized during the search did not offend the fifth
amendment proscription that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in
a criminal case. 44 U.S.L.W. at 5130.
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tion of privacy, 100 but this protection does not extend to evidence
which a person voluntarily makes available to law enforcement
officers. 101 The fourth amendment requires that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant unless a search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. 102 Consent searches constitute
one of the most significant exceptions to the warrant requirement.
An individual may consent to a search by law enforcement officers,
thereby permitting official intrusions which would otherwise be
impermissible without a warrant. With respect to noncustodial
consent searches the government must demonstrate that "the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or
coercion, express or implied." 103 In this context the courts lack an
objective standard with which to measure the voluntariness of
consent. 104 Rather, in Schneckloth v. Bustamante. 105 the Supreme
Court held that the voluntariness of a consent to search is "to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. " 106
Before Schneckloth, the consent doctrine was assumed to be
based on the traditional test of waiver, "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 107 The
Schneckloth Court noted that such a test was applicable only to
those constitutional rights which, unlike the fourth amendment
right, are intended to protect the fair determination of truth at a
trial. Balancing the requirement of assuring that consent to a

10
° Katz v. United States, :389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). See generally Weinreb. Generalities
of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 187 (1968).
101
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351.
102 Exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches incident to a valid arrest
(Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)); "hot pursuit" (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967)); "plain view" (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)); and consent
searches.
103 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). The defendant himself does
not necessarily have to give consent. United States v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
Notably, in practice, consents obtained in the course of income tax investigations are
received from the principals, not from third parties such as wives or employees. In this
respect. however. it should be mentioned that IRS agents need not obtain consent to
examine financial records maintained by a taxpayer's accountant. Fisher v. United States.
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
10 • See Weinreb, supra note 100; Comment, A Valid Consent to Search Does Not Require
Knowledge of the Constitutionally Protected Right to Refuse. 9 GoNz. L. REV. 845 (1974);
Comment, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Examined: A Formulation of Constitutional Protections in Fourth Amendment Consent Searches. 5 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 556 (1974).
105 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth. a highway patrolman requested and received
permission to search a vehicle. The search resulted in the discovery of stolen checks hidden
under one of the seats. Arguing that his fourth amendment rights were violated because he
was not informed by the officer that he could withhold consent. the defendant sought to
suppress the incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a
Miranda-type warning. based on knowledge and willingness. should be created for consent
search situations. Id. at 229.
106
Id. at 248.
101
Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
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search was not the product of coercion against a "legitimate need
for such searches," 108 the Court rejected an analogy to Miranda by
not requiring law enforcement officers to warn persons of their
rights whenever they sought consent to a search. Since the voluntariness of consent was a question of fact to be determined by a
consideration of all of the circumstances of a case, the Court
viewed the knowledge of the right to withhold consent as only one
factor for courts to consider in determining voluntariness. 109 According to the Schneckloth Court, other factors, including the
intelligence and education of a defendant, were also germane to
assessing the voluntariness of a consent search.11°
Under the standard articulated in Schneckloth, a defendant may
have difficulty proving that his consent was involuntary, 111 unless
he can demonstrate that the government obtained consent by coercion or deception. 112 Although a taxpayer will amost never be
subjected to physical coercion, he may seek to challenge his alleged consent to an IRS examination of his records by claiming that
consent was obtained by deception. 113 The question in such cases
is whether, in view of all the circumstances, a taxpayer's consent
will be adjudged involuntary because of deception or misrepresentation on the part of the investigating agents. Two situations recur.
First, a taxpayer may consent to a civil investigation of his records
which leads to a subsequent criminal inquiry. 114 This raises a
question with respect to the continuing validity of the consent.
Second, a taxpayer may consent to what he believes is an investigation into his civil liability when, in fact, an investigation of his
criminal liability is already in progress.11 5

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
Id. at 241-43. 248.
Id. at 248. An additional factor would be the failure to advise a suspect of his rights. Id.
at 227. Other courts have stated that the giving of warnings would be relevant evidence with
respect to questions of coercion and fraud. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348
(1976); Cohen v. United States. 405 F.2d 34. 39 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943,
(1969).
111
Weinreb. supra note 100. at 56-57. But see Comment, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
Examined, supra note 104.
112
See, e.g., Gouled v. United States. 225 U.S. 298 (1921); United States v. Bland, 458
F.2d I (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831 ( 1970). The Prudden court explicitly rejected the government's contention that IRS
agents may use fraud, deceit, or trickery in obtaining evidence. Id. at 1032 n.21.
113 See, e.g., United States v. Peskin. 527 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3249 (Oct.4.1976); United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Prudden. 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831. (1970); United States
v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Vander Linden, Crim. No. 76-29
(S.D. Iowa July 6. 1976) (order granting motion to suppress); United States v. Trnka, 385 F.
Supp. 628 (D.N.D. 1974).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d I 196 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004
(1973); United States v. Trnka, 385 F. Supp. 628 (D.N.D. 1974).
115
This complaint frequently arises from joint investigations conducted by special and
revenue agents. See, e.g., United States v. Stamp. 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cohen v.
10
10

•

•
110
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Where taxpayers have been the victims of blatant deception,
courts have found consent to be invalid. 116 In United States ,,.
Vander Linden, 117 the taxpayer, a pharmacist suspected of illegal
drug sales, consented to a civil audit of hi~ records by a revenue
agent. Yander Linden was unaware that the agent was connected
with the Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (DALE) program, a project aimed at drug traffickers and supervised by the Intelligence
Division of the IRS. 118 After an audit of the year in question
revealed no evidence of tax fraud, the revenue agent received
approval from the Audit and Intelligence Divisions to audit earlier
years even though the usual procedure would have been to terminate the investigation. Evidence of possible tax fraud was discovered during this audit resulting in the indictment of Yander Linden.
In suppressing the evidence, the court held that the civil audit was
merely a disguise for a criminal investigation. In the court's view,
when the taxpayer consented to the inspection of his records for
the purported civil tax audit, his consent was obtained under false
pretenses and was therefore involuntary . 1 rn
Similarly, a taxpayer may be able to show that his consent was
invalid if an agent explicitly assured him that the sole purpose of an
investigation was to ascertain the amount of a civil liability without
indicating that an investigation may result in a criminal prosecu-

United States. 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v.
Vander Linden. Crim. No. 76-29 (S.D. Iowa July 6. 1976) (order granting motion to
suppress). A number of taxpayers have contended that revenue agents acting on the basis of
tips relayed from the Intelligence Division· actually are functioning as criminal investigators. E.g .. United States v. McCorkle. 511 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975). But lj. United States
v. Stamp. 458 F.2d 759. 779 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (where the court stated that agents need not
inform a suspect taxpayer of their criminal suspicions if the only basis was a tip from a
citizen informant).
116
See note I 15 supra. IRS agents are now forbidden by regulation from engaging in
deceitful practices. including promises of immunity and favorable settlements. and from
threatening or intimidating taxpayers. HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS, supra note 19. at ,i
242.136(6); INT. REV. MAN. (CCH) ,i 9384.2(3) (Aug.13.1974). Nonetheless. it is possible
for an agent to be personally unaware of the true institutional motivation for an investigation, resulting in unintended misrepresentations to the taxpayer regarding the objective of
the search. See Note. Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations, supra note 6.
117 Crim. No. 76--29 (S.D. Iowa July 6. 1976) (order granting motion to suppress). See also
Goodman v. United States. 285 F. Supp. 245 (C.D. Cal. 1968). where an agent obtained
incriminating documents from a taxpayer by falsely telling him that the records would only
be used in an investigation directed at a third party. The court suppressed the evidence upon
finding that the agent had engaged in deliberate misrepresentation to induce the taxpayer to
consent to the search of his records. Id. at 251.
118 DALE was a cooperative effort of the IRS and the Justice Department. Revenue
agents were trained to be alert for signs of prohibited drug-related activities.
"" United States v. Vander Linden. Crim. No. 76--29 (S.D. Iowa. July 6, 1976) (order
granting motion to suppress). at 1-4. 10. The government has not appealed the suppression
order. Letter from Mr. Drew Tillotsen. defense attorney for Mr. Vander Linden. to the
author (September 22. 1976) (on file with the U. M1cH. J.L. REF.). It should be noted that
defendant Yander Linden was earlier completely exonerated of the drug charges.
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tion. 120 In United States,,. Robson, 121 the court stated that special
or revenue agents must not affirmatively mislead a taxpayer into
believing that an investigation is exclusively civil, and will not lead
to criminal charges. The Rohsun court refused to order a suppression, however, because the agent involved did not use the word
"civil" when explaining the audit to the taxpayer. 122
Most defendant taxpayers, however, cannot aver actual deception or misrepresentation on the part of I RS agents. Rather, taxpayers are more likely to challenge the validity of consent on the
grounds that investigating agents did not explain the inherent
jeopardy of tax investigations. The voluntariness of consent may
be affected by an individual's ignorance and misimpressions concerning tax investigations, particularly by the belief that only civil
liability is at stake. The most common misconceptions, however,
are the beliefs that the IRS can obtain by other means any information which is not willingly provided, and that cooperation buys the
good will of the investigating agents. 123 Moreover, a meeting with
an IRS agent may not manifest the possibility of criminal prosecution as clearly as a confrontation with a police officer. 12 -1 Arguably,
therefore, the taxpayer cases are atypical fourth amendment situations and may be distinguished from Schnecklvth v. B11stamunte on
that basis . 125 The taxpayer is at such a disadvantage vis-a-vis the
IRS when compared with typical situations involving police
searches that there would seem to be a greater need for a taxpayer
to be informed of his right to refuse permission for a search and of
the possible consequences of a search. Nevertheless, courts have
required clear and convincing evidence of material affirmative
misrepresentations by IRS agents in order to invalidate a consent

120
See. e.g .. United States v. Robson. 477 F.2d 13. 18 (9th Cir. 1973); Cohen v. United
States, 405 F.2d 34. 36 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1968); United States v.
Wheeler, 149 F. Supp. 445,449 (W.D. Pa. 1957). Cf. United States v. Maciel. 351 F. Supp.
817, 819 (D.R.!. 1972) (where a special agent told the taxpayer that he did not need to hire a
lawyer-advice that was not only wrong, but which contradicted a warning given by an
earlier special agent to the taxpayer).
121
477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973.) See also United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th
Circ), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.
1968). cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969).
122
Id. at 18.
123
Stafford & Jackson, supra note 5. at 738-39 (1974). Even attorneys profess to believe
that absolute cooperation will protect their clients or themselves from criminal prosecution.
United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765, 768 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971);
United States v. Trnka. 385 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (D.N.D. 1974).
124
United States v. Stamp. 458 F.2d 759, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Cf. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte. 412 U.S 218 (1973) (where a uniformed officer was not required to deliver
fourth amendment warnings under the totality of the circumstances test). Not surprisingly.
few taxpayers understand the distinction between revenue agents and special agents. See
United States v. Bland. 458 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1972). See note 4 supra.
125
See notes 103-10 and accompanying text supra.
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search. 12 H Courts have generally refused to hold that an agent's
silence as to the possible or actual criminal purpose of an investigation is affirmative misrepresentation. unless a taxpayer has specifically inquired about the scope of the investigation. 127 In United
States, .. Bland, 128 for example. the court stated that while it might
be misrepresentation for a special agent to fail to identify his office.
the taxpayer. who was unaware of the difference between revenue
agents and special agents. was not misled with respect to the nature
of the investigation. 12 i1 Since the misrepresentation did not have a
material impact on the voluntariness of the consent. the Bland
court upheld the search.
Under the totality of circumstances test articulated in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 130 affirmative misrepresentation is
only one factor to be considered in deciding whether valid consent
given at the civil stage of an investigation carries over to the
criminal stage. Other elements include the relative sophistication
of taxpayers, 131 the inherently admonitory nature of an investigation, 132 and the demeanor of investigating agents. i:i:i United States
, .. Stamp, 134 which arose from a complex joint investigation into

126
E.g .. United States v. Bland. 458 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Prudden. 424
F.2d 1021. 1033 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Cohen v. United States. 405
F.2d 34, 36 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 394 U.S. 943 (1969).
127
United States v. Robson. 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Prudden, 424
F.2d 1021. 1032 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970). But cf. United States v.
Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1970) (where revenue and special agents received
several inquiries from suspect taxpayers as to the nature of the investigation and the reason
for its lengthy duration. but were held not to have misrepresented their criminal investigation because the agents never affirmatively stated that they were only interested in civil
liability).
128
458 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1972).
1
' " Id. at 8. The Bland court referred to News Release lR-949 in noting that. had the facts
arisen under the News Release Doctrine. the special agent would have been obligated to
identify his office and his function. Id. at 9 n.7.
130
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
131
See. e.g .. United States v. Peskin. 527 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975). cert. denied. 45
U.S.L.W. 3249 (Oct. 4. 1976) (attorney); United States v. Stamp. 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (businessmen); United States v. Tonahill. 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970) (tax attorney).
132
See. e.g., United States v. Prudden. 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.. ). cert. denied, 400 U.S.
831 (1970); United States v. Squeri. 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968). As the Second Circuit
observed in United States v. Scalfani. 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 360 U.S. 918
(1959):
A "routine" tax investigation openly commenced as such is devoid of stealth or
deceit because the ordinary taxpayer surely knows that there is inherent in it a
warning that the government's agents will pursue evidence of misreporting without
regard to the shadowy line between avoidance and evasion. mistake and willful
evasion.
Id. at 414-15.
133
Perhaps the weakest argument a taxpayer can make is that he was misled by the
friendliness and cordiality of agents. or that he interpreted an agent's activities as indicating
the closing of the investigation without criminal consequences. See. e.g .. United States v.
Marra. 481 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1973). cert. denied. 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); United States v.
Prudden. 424 F. 2d I021 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (I 970).
134
458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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the affairs of several public officials, 135 involved a taxpayer who
had consented to a civil audit, but had not been notified that the
investigation had criminal implications. Stamp contended that an
agent had told him that the audit was "routine" and that his
consent was limited to the calculation of his civil deficiency. The
court considered the totality of the circumstances before deciding
the "close question" in favor of the government. 136 Noting that all
tax investigations have misleading features which would not alone
justify suppressing evidence, the Stamp court conceded that taxpayers might show that a search had exceeded the scope of the
consent given. The sophistication of the taxpayer proved to be the
decisive factor in the Stamp case. With a background in finance,
taxation, and law, Stamp was presumed to know that a civil tax
audit could develop into a criminal tax fraud investigation, espe-

135
Several revenue agents and special agents were involved in the investigations. Although the Revenue Agents did not inform the suspect taxpayer of possible criminal
liabilities when obtaining consent for the audits. the Stamp court found that the revenue
agents had not exceeded the scope of routine civil audits. and, therefore. had not misrepresented their own duties. Id. at 778-79.
136
/d. at 775-77. 779-80. The investigation in Stamp was a joint investigation; it was
partially civil and partially criminal from its inception. Nevertheless. the Stamp court
considered prior cases involving the continuing effectiveness of a consent to search after an
originally civil investigation has become criminal. The majority view was that IRS agents
were under no duty to disclose the changing nature of an investigation to suspect taxpayers;
a valid consent to a civil investigation would continue to be valid after the investigation
changed complexion. Provided a taxpayer was not affirmatively misled at the time of his
consent. the warning inherent in the nature of an investigation was considered adequate to
protect his interests. United States v. Scalfani. 265 F.2d 408. 415 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 918 (1959); Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954). The Stamp court rejected the Sea/Jani court's view
that keeping taxpayers advised of the changing character of the investigation would be
burdensome for the IRS, but the Stamp court did not hold that the IRS had to inform
taxpayers if their status changed. 458 F.2d at 776. See Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227,
229 (2d Cir. 1%1), where the court indicated that such warnings would be preferable in order
to protect constitutional rights and to reduce the number of motions to suppress.
A second approach is characterized by United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D.
Pa. 1953). where the court refused to allow the government to use evidence obtained during
the criminal stage of an investigation because the taxpayer had intended to consent only to a
search for evidence of civil liability. This case, however, may be explained as one involving
affirmative misrepresentation and subterfuge because a special agent got access to the
taxpayer's records via an appointment made for him by a revenue agent. who was conducting a civil audit. Id. at 128-29. Application of Bodkin, 165 F. Supp. 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1958),
which involved a secret joint investigation. may be similarly explained.
The position of the Stamp court is most nearly in accord with that of a third judicial
theory. illustrated by two cases. United States v. Lipshitz. 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y.
1955), and United States v. Wolrich. 129 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). These courts
considered the specific facts of the cases to determine whether there were any misleading
elements in addition to those inherent in complex tax investigations. This approach approximates that of the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 ( 1973), in that
the validity of continuing a consent to the criminal stage of investigation depended on the
totality of the circumstances. It should be noted that the Stamp court was able to reconcile
the Sea/Jani and lipshitz positions because each first considered the initial voluntariness of
the consent. The Sea/Jani court found the taxpayer's consent to be voluntary, while the
lipshitz and Wu/rich courts determined that investigating agents had from the beginning
conducted investigations which were broader than a proper civil tax audit. 458 F.2d at 776.
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cially since he was aware of his own culpability . 137 The court
further stated that such a taxpayer would not have been misled by
the use of the agent's statement that the search was "routine." The
Stamp court indicated, however, that the decision might have gone
the other way if the defendant had been a less sophisticated taxpayer.13s
While an unsophisticated taxpayer would seldom be the object of
a Stamp-type investigation, the implication of the case and its
application of a totality-of-the-circumstances test for the IRS is
apparent; the Service may lose evidence on grounds of fraudulently induced consent, unless it can demonstrate that suspect
taxpayers knew of their actual or potential jeopardy at the time
consent was given. The Stamp court indicated that it would not be
impractical for the IRS to keep taxpayers informed of the status of
investigations. 139 Moreover, if special agents are involved, the
News Release IR-949 warnings clearly reveal that a criminal investigation is underway . 140 The IRS not only does not have to meet
the requirements of a prophylactic rule, but it seems likely that the
courts will not decide in favor of taxpayers whose claims of involuntary consent lack credibility. Nevertheless, even if a taxpayer
cannot demonstrate actual deception or misrepresentation by an
agent, he may be able to show his consent was involuntary because
it was given without knowledge of the possible consequences of a
tax investigation.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Recent decisions have limited the grounds upon which taxpayers
facing criminal prosecution may seek to suppress incriminating
evidence. The decision in Beckwith v. United States virtually
eliminates the availability of the Miranda doctrine to the subjects
of criminal tax fraud investigations by defining custody so as to
exclude instances wherein the subject is not under arrest and is free
to depart at will. For the Miranda doctrine to be available the
taxpayer would need to satisfy the "special cirCllmstances" exception to the custody requirement. There may also be grounds to
suppress incriminating evidence if IRS special agents have failed to

137

458 F.2d at 779-80.
Id.
139
Id. at 776. See note 138 supra.
1 0
•
Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341 {1976); Cohen v. United States. 405 F.2d 34
(8th Cir. 1968). cert. denied. 394 U.S. 943 (1969).
13s
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accurately give the News Release IR-949 warnings. This may occur
if the jurisdiction accepts the News Release doctrine, and if the
taxpayer is able to convince the court that the agent did not
substantially comply with the warning procedure. Finally, taxpayers may be able to suppress evidence on the fourth amendment
ground that their consent to an IRS search was involuntary. The
involuntariness of consent is determined from the totality of the
circumstances, although courts heavily weigh evidence that a taxpayer knew of his potential criminal jeopardy when he gave his
consent. While a taxpayer, compared with the subjects of typical
fourth amendment searches and seizures, is less likely to recognize
the full extent of his jeopardy in the absence of warnings, only in
cases of actual deception or misrepresentation by IRS agents is
suppression on fourth amendment grounds likely.
--Curtis L. Christensen

